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Blocking is the most important phenomenon in the history of associative learning theory:
for over 40 years, blocking has inspired a whole generation of learning models. Blocking
is part of a family of effects that are typically termed “cue competition” effects. Common
amongst all cue competition effects is that a cue-outcome relation is poorly learned or
poorly expressed because the cue is trained in the presence of an alternative predictor
or cause of the outcome. We provide an overview of the cognitive processes involved
in cue competition effects in humans and propose a stage framework that brings these
processes together.The framework contends that the behavioral display of cue competition
is cognitively construed following three stages that include (1) an encoding stage, (2) a
retention stage, and (3) a performance stage.We argue that the stage framework supports
a comprehensive understanding of cue competition effects.
Keywords: learning theory, associative learning, conditioning, cue competition, stimulus competition, blocking,
prediction error
INTRODUCTION
Associative learning refers to a change in behavior due to regular-
ities in stimulus presentation (De Houwer et al., 2013). Interest-
ingly, this definition remains silent on the psychological process
that underlies learning. Arguably, that process is mostly informed
by stimulus arrangements that donot produce the expected change
in behavior. The blocking procedure is the most famous exam-
ple of these stimulus arrangements. In this learning procedure, a
cue of interest is trained together with another cue that already
predicts the occurrence of the outcome. That is, pairings of two
cues with the outcome are preceded by pairings of only one of
both cues with the outcome (i.e., A+ followed by AX+ training).
kamin (unpublished, p. 5) pioneered this procedure, by present-
ing rats with pairings of a white noise stimulus with shock (A+)
followed by pairings of a compound of the white noise stimu-
lus and a new light stimulus with shock (AX+), and made the
famous observation that “prior conditioning to an element might
block conditioning to a new, superimposed element.” This result
has since been replicated many times, supporting the idea that
preparatory responding to a redundant cue remains low, despite
its being paired with the outcome. The blocking effect has been
demonstrated with diverse learning procedures — for example
using appetitive and aversive learning protocols (Kamin, unpub-
lished; Jennings and Kirkpatrick, 2006), taste-aversion protocols
(Willner, 1978), spatial learning (Rodrigo et al., 1997), and human
causal learning (Dickinson et al., 1984). In addition, there is evi-
dence of blocking in a variety of species including snails (e.g.,
Acebes et al., 2009; Prados et al., 2013), honeybees (e.g., Blaser
et al., 2004), goldfish (e.g., Tennant and Bitterman, 1975), rats
(e.g., kamin, unpublished), and humans (Dickinson et al., 1984).
Blocking is part of a family of effects that are typically termed
“cue competition” effects. Common amongst all cue competition
effects is that a cue-outcome relation is poorly learned or poorly
expressed because the cue is trained in the presence of an alter-
native predictor or cause of the outcome. For example, Pavlov
(1927) reported that mere compound training of two stimuli (i.e.,
AX+) resulted in lower preparatory responding to each individ-
ual cue relative to if the stimuli were trained elementally (i.e.,
A+/X+; i.e., overshadowing). Importantly, in both blocking and
overshadowing, the cue of interest is trained in compound with
a competing cue, but in blocking, the competing cue is previ-
ously paired with the outcome, whereas in overshadowing, the
competing cue is initially neutral. Consequently, overshadowing
is often used as a control for blocking because this control isolates
the effect of prior training of the competing stimulus (see Arce-
diano et al., 2001, pp. 355–356, for an excellent discussion of the
blocking control condition). Other demonstrations of cue compe-
tition effects include probabilistic cue effects and relative validity,
in which the cue of interest (X) is reinforced in the presence of one
cue (A) and not reinforced in the presence of another cue (B) (i.e.,
AX+/BX−; Wagner et al., 1968; Baker et al., 1993; Krushke and
Johansen, 1999). Interestingly, the order of training in a normal
blocking procedure can also be reversed (i.e., AX+ followed byA+
training; e.g., Shanks, 1985), resulting in a form of retrospective
cue competition, called backward blocking.
For over 40 years, blocking has inspired a whole generation
of influential learning models (e.g., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972;
Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980; Wagner, 1981; Miller
and Matzel, 1988; Mitchell et al., 2009). Dominant theories of
associative learning typically rely on low-level link formations
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(i.e., associations) to implement learning at the algorithmic level,
that is the level of psychological processes (Marr, 1982). Conse-
quently, such models are termed association formation models
(AFMs), as learning is characterized by the trial-by-trial forma-
tion of unqualified links that transmit activation from one mental
representation to another, very much like a piece of copper wire
conducts electricity. Some AFMsmoreover invoke additional cog-
nitive processes or mental states that presumably facilitate and/or
enable link formation, such as attention and expectancy discrep-
ancy (e.g., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce
and Hall, 1980), amongst others. The psychological interpreta-
tion given to the influential Rescorla–Wagnermodel (Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972), for example, states that the change in associative
strength is determined by the amount of expectancy discrepancy
(“prediction error”): In a blocking procedure, the preceding A+
training renders the outcome to be expected on AX+ trials, and
therefore, an associative link between cue X and the outcome pre-
sumably cannot form. In contrast to AFMs, inferential learning
theorists have challenged the standard presupposition that learn-
ing is based on link formation. They argue that link formation is a
superfluous concept and as an alternative they argue that all asso-
ciative learning effects, including cue competition phenomena,
can be explained by the interplay between memory for proposi-
tions and higher-order reasoning (e.g., De Houwer, 2009; Mitchell
et al., 2009). In a blocking procedure, for example, subjects sup-
posedly infer that the blocked cue is unlikely to be (causally)
related to the outcome, because the relation between the blocked
cue and the outcome disappears if one controls for the relation
between the blocking cue and the outcome. Accordingly, when-
ever the non-efficacy of the blocked cue can be validly inferred
(see further in this paper), subjects should display blocking. The
sometimes-intense debate between AFMs and inferential learn-
ing theories and their rivaling accounts of cue competition have
been reviewed elsewhere (e.g., De Houwer and Beckers, 2002;
De Houwer et al., 2005; Pineño and Miller, 2007; Shanks, 2010;
McLaren et al., 2014) and are beyond the scope of the present
paper.
In the present paper, we will present a cognitive stage frame-
work for understanding blocking and related cue competition
effects. Our aim is to discuss and organize the cognitive pro-
cesses that play an important role in cue competition effects.
In line with the suggestions of Meiser (2011), we will focus on
cognitive processes that can be applied in a variety of research
paradigms. AFMs were specifically developed to account for how
regularities in stimulus presentation result in changes in behav-
ior. But paradigm-specific theoretical models may fail to identify
processes that are operating in other research paradigms. This
hinders the development of more integrative frameworks with a
broader range of applicability that go beyond the paradigm at
hand (Meiser, 2011). Thus, where possible, we will invoke cogni-
tive processes that are known to facilitate behavioral adaptation in
research paradigms other than the associative learning paradigm.
More precisely, we will consider processes like perception, atten-
tion, working memory, memory, higher-order reasoning and
inhibition.
In the first section of this paper (“Cognitive processes in
cue competition”), a number of cognitive processes and their
involvement in cue competition are described. While doing so,
we will additionally try to bridge the gap between construct for-
mulations in mainstream cognitive psychology (see Neisser, 1967
and Lindsay and Norman, 1972 for texts influential in defining
mainstream cognitive psychology) and construct formulations in
the field of associative learning. In the second section of this
paper (“A cognitive stage framework for cue competition”), a
stage framework is presented and is used to integrate the cognitive
processes that are involved in cue competition. Existing theories
typically invoke just one or two cognitive processes, which may
have led to ignoring or underemphasizing interplay. Here, we
attempt to correct this oversight by providing a framework that
integrates processes. Following the presentation of our framework,
we will demonstrate how this framework can inspire new empir-
ical research in the General Discussion. Among the family of cue
competition effects, we will mainly focus on the blocking effect,
because of its special status in associative learning theory.
SECTION 1: COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN CUE COMPETITION
For starters, we will discuss several cognitive processes that are
involved in cue competition phenomena. These cognitive pro-
cesses will be discussed according to the following main headings:
perception, attention, working memory, higher-order reasoning,
memory, and inhibition. As said, we will cite studies and mech-
anisms from both the association formation tradition and the
mainstream cognitive psychology tradition, and try to connect
both traditions where possible. The cognitive processes discussed
in this section of the paper will serve as building blocks to engineer
the stage framework presented in the second section of the paper.
PERCEPTION
A failure to perceptually process a cue represents an obvious path-
way to later behavioral display of cue competition: The subject
must detect the stimulus during the learning episode in order to
come to respond in its presence (see Pearce and Bouton, 2001, for
a similar argument). The hypothesis that lack of perception might
lead to cue competition effects is consistent with most views in
cognitive psychology, which assume that the processing capacity
for perception is limited. In line with this, neuroscientists have
argued that stimuli compete for neural representation because
of the limited processing resources of the brain (e.g., Desimone
and Duncan, 1995; Pessoa et al., 2002; Bishop, 2008). Unfortu-
nately, there are, to the best of our knowledge, virtually no studies
that directly relate this issue to the development of cue competi-
tion effects. This lack of data arises primarily from the fact that
in “most Pavlovian paradigms, the conditions are so simple and
impoverished that they probably do not come close to overtaxing
an animal’s capacity to process such information” (Blaisdell, 2003,
p. 148). So, although in most studies there is no reason to expect
a deficit in perception in a blocking condition (as compared to an
overshadowing control condition), it could play a role in (more
naturalistic) situations involving many stimuli. It is of note that
cue competition may not only involve cases of failing to perceive
a cue during the learning episode, but a failure to perceive it at
test as well (due to a change in perceptual context; Pearce, 1987,
1994). Further discussion of this latter possibility is reserved for
the section on memory retrieval.
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ATTENTION
Although perception needs more investigation in cue competition
research, the construct of attention, defined as the prioritized pro-
cessing of information at the cost of other information (Allport,
1989), has long been the focus of theoretical consideration in the
cognitive and associative learning fields.
According to Mackintosh (1975), the amount of attention
devoted to cues is modulated by the relative predictiveness of
those cues: Relative to the other cues present during training,
more attention is paid to a cue on the next trial if it was a bet-
ter predictor of the outcome on the previous trial(s), whereas less
attention is paid to a cue on the next trial if it was a poorer pre-
dictor of the outcome. The Pearce–Hall model (Pearce and Hall,
1980) also focuses on the role of attention in learning, but in con-
trast to Mackintosh (1975), it states that more attention will be
allocated to cues that are followed by a surprising outcome, rela-
tive to cues that are followed by an unsurprising outcome. Both
of these models account for cue competition effects, including
the blocking effect, by assuming that the amount of attention
allocated to a cue determines learning and therefore respond-
ing. In a more traditional cognitive framework, such allocation
of attention might be thought of as attentional regulation. Top–
down attention is regulated by task-demands and goal-directed
intent of the observer (e.g., Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Pessoa
et al., 2002; Bishop, 2008). It has been proposed that organisms
use top-down control as a way to direct their attention to “what-
ever information is relevant to current behavior” so as to allow
the organism to adapt its behavior to the current environment
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995; p. 199). Attentional disengage-
ment from redundant information is considered an essential
part of such top–down regulation (e.g., Hopfinger et al., 2000).
In a blocking procedure, this might be evident in attentional
disengagement from the blocked cue, which is redundant to solv-
ing the task, during training. Top–down attention differs from
bottom–up attention, which is determined by properties of the
stimuli. Interestingly, a recent study shows that the predictive
value of a stimulus might automatically direct attention to that
stimulus (Le Pelley et al., 2013). This suggests a potentially impor-
tant role for bottom–up attention during blocking training as
well.
Empirical evidence for the role of attention in cue competi-
tion procedures includes demonstrations that new learning about
a blocked cue is retarded: Blocking treatment interferes with sub-
sequent learning, even when an outcome different from the one
during blocking training is used. This interference effect is pre-
sumably due to a decrease in attention paid to the blocked cue,
caused by the preceding blocking treatment (e.g., Mackintosh and
Turner, 1971; Le Pelley et al., 2007). As noted by Beesley and Le
Pelley (2011), such data are, however, preliminary because they
only implicate attention in cue competition under the aforemen-
tioned assumption that the amount of attention paid to a cue
modulates how rapidly that cue is learned about. Recently, how-
ever, several studies used the eye tracking method to study the
effect of blocking treatment on overt attention more directly (e.g.,
Kruschke et al., 2005; Beesley and Le Pelley, 2011; Eippert et al.,
2012; also see Wills et al., 2007). Results indicated that subjects
spent less time gazing at blocked cues and that dwell time for
blocked cues decreased over training blocks. The latter observa-
tion suggests that the subjects learn to not attend to the blocked
cue during training.
An attentional process related to attentional regulation, atten-
tional bias, might play a role in cue competition as well. Biases in
processing threat or reward related information (Bradley et al.,
2004; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Bishop, 2008) might for example
have important effects on cue competition, but, to the best of our
knowledge, this has not been directly investigated. Still, it is rea-
sonable to hypothesize that a cue that signals a biologically relevant
event would take up a disproportionately large amount of atten-
tion relative to an innocuous stimulus. Based on this rationale,
blocking can be explained by assuming that pairing the blocking
cue with an important event in the first phase creates an atten-
tional bias to this cue and, consequently, the blocked cue might
come to receive relatively less attention.
WORKING MEMORY
Workingmemory is a construct that cognitive psychologists use to
account for why informational processing is limited and refers to a
process that accounts for temporary storage and manipulation of
information necessary to carry out complex tasks (e.g., Baddeley,
1986).
An established strategy to assess whether a task depends on use
of workingmemory is to overburden workingmemory with a sec-
ond task and to examine the effect of doing so on performance
to the task of interest. Relying on this strategy, De Houwer and
Beckers (2003) observed that a working memory load decreased
forward blocking performance. In a first experiment they over-
burdened working memory during the acquisition phase only,
whereas they overburdened working memory during both the
acquisition and the test phase in a second experiment. The pattern
of results was alike in both experiments, a high working memory
load reduced blocking relative to the control group, but com-
parisons with the control group only reached significance in the
second experiment. However, Waldmann and Walker (2005) also
reported a significant decrease in blocking following administra-
tion of a secondary task load during only the acquisition phase.
In a more recent study, Liu and Luhmann (2013) pinpointed
that such cognitive load during acquisition has its effect in the
early portions of phase 2 AX+ training. Taken together, these
studies point to the important role that working memory has in
modulating cue competition effects. More precisely, they suggest
that blocking (at least sometimes) reflects effortful processing,
something we will return to in the subsection on higher-order
reasoning.
HIGHER-ORDER REASONING
Inferential learning theory (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2005; also see,
e.g.,Waldmann, 2000) states that conditional reasoning is involved
in cue competition. Onemight indeed argue that the blocking pro-
cedure presents the subject with a reasoning problem: The subject
has to determine whether or not the blocked cue is (causally)
related to the outcome in order to predict whether the outcome
is likely to occur in the presence of the blocked cue alone. This
suggests that the blocking effect reflects the organism’s reason-
ing that the blocked cue is an unlikely cause of the outcome.
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As scientists, we are of course all familiar with the notion that
correlation does not mean causation and the blocking stimulus
indeed screens off the relation between the blocked stimulus and
the outcome. In the inferential learning theory framework, block-
ing is, more exactly, hypothesized to be an instance of a modus
tollens argument: If a conditional statement (“if p then q”) is
assumed to be true, and the consequent does not hold (not-q),
then the negation of the antecedent (not-p) should be inferred.
Subjects in a blocking procedure are assumed to entertain the
assumption that a combination of two causes of the outcome
should result in an outcome of greater magnitude (i.e., the addi-
tivity conditional). Accordingly, participants can infer that the
blocked cue is no cause of the outcome following blocking train-
ing, because if the blocked cue were an independent cause of the
outcome, then the magnitude of the outcome should be greater
during compound training than during elemental training. Below
are the arguments for the involvement of inferential reasoning in
cue competition.
As said, application of themodus tollens argument in the block-
ing procedures depends on the assumption that a combination
of two causes should result in an outcome of greater magni-
tude. Several experiments indeed demonstrated that providing
subjects with information that either confirms or goes against this
additivity conditional respectively increases or reduces the block-
ing effect (e.g., Lovibond et al., 2003; Livesey and Boakes, 2004;
Beckers et al., 2005). Among the same lines, forward blocking
should be obtained more easily if the outcome presented during
A+ training is non-maximal, because only in such case the causal
non-efficacy of the blocked cue X can be validly inferred. If cue
A and the AX compound result in an outcome with an intensity
that corresponds to themaximal possible intensity, the causal non-
efficacy of X cannot be validly deduced, because of a ceiling effect.
Consistent with this analysis, De Houwer et al. (2002; also see
Beckers et al., 2006) observed stronger blocking in a submaximal
than in a maximal condition.
The forward blocking effect hasmoreover proved to be sensitive
to the scenarioa in which the contingency training is embedded.
In a predictive learning procedure, participants are asked to rate
a predictive relation between a cue and an outcome, whereas in a
causal learning procedure, participants are asked to rate the causal
relation between a cue and an outcome. De Houwer et al. (2002;
Pineño et al., 2005a) foundblocking in a causal learningprocedure,
but not in a predictive learning procedure. Similarly, Waldmann
and Holyoak (1992), Waldmann (2000) showed that blocking is
obtained more readily if cues A and X are described as causes of
the outcome than when cues A and X are described as effects of the
outcome. Arguably, the categorization of cues as causes serves as
input for a higher-order reasoning system and facilitates blocking
by means of activation of the previously described conditionals
such as the assumption that causes tend to have additive effects
(e.g., De Houwer, 2009). It should however be added that these
findings have not always been consistent; several studies found
no effect of scenario (e.g., Shanks and Lopez, 1996; Cobos et al.,
2002).
Reasoning is presumably an effortful process: Several influ-
ential reasoning theories invoke working memory capacity when
explaining reasoning performance (e.g., Baddeley andHitch, 1974;
Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994). Research indeed
demonstrates that the amount of errors in standard conditional
reasoning tasks increases when working memory is overloaded
(e.g., Toms et al., 1993; De Neys et al., 2005). As previously
discussed, working memory load decreases forward blocking
performance, as would be predicted by general theories of con-
ditional reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991; Rips,
1994). Strictly speaking, these studies only suggest that an effort-
ful process is involved in blocking, but there is no logical reason
why conditional reasoning would be the only possible candidate
effortful process. Interestingly, however, Vandorpe et al. (2005)
presented more direct evidence suggesting that working mem-
ory can interfere with the making of a valid inference: Secondary
task difficulty modulated the number of subjects that were able to
verbally report a valid blocking inference in their study.
MEMORY
Memory processes play an important role in associative learning
in general (e.g., Bouton and Moody, 2004) and, by extension, a
variety of memory processes (including memory encoding, mem-
ory retrieval, and memory rehearsal) also play a crucial role in cue
competition phenomena.
Memory encoding
Several influential AFMs suggest that the presence of A on AX+
trials results in the formation of a weaker association or memory
trace for stimulus X (e.g., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Mackin-
tosh, 1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980). According to these theories, a
memory-encoding deficit lies at the basis of cue competition.
Memory retrieval
Association formation models emphasize memory retrieval as a
crucial factor in cue competition as well. Comparator theory
(Miller and Schachtman, 1985; Miller and Matzel, 1988) states
that at the time of testing (a) the strength of the association
between the tested cue and the outcome is retrieved and men-
tally compared with (b) the strength of the association between
comparator cues and the outcome. For example, in a blocking
procedure, in which A+ training is followed by AX+ training, A
is X’s comparator cue due to its presence during training of X.
As a result of the separate A+ training, the strength of the asso-
ciation between A and the outcome will outweigh the strength
of the association between X and the outcome during testing,
yielding reduced responding to X and, hence, blocking. So, the
strength of responding to stimulus X is determined by comparing
the strength of the directly and indirectly (i.c., via A) retrieved
X-outcome association. Configural theories (Pearce, 1987, 1994),
in their turn, suggest that onAX+ trials an association or memory
trace is formed between the AX configuration and the outcome.
X at test is considered to be a new configuration, which was never
presented with the outcome. However, the conditioned response
will generalize from AX to X and the strength of the response
will depend on the perceived similarity between AX and X. Cue
competition is then the result from a submaximal retrieval of the
outcome-memory by X.
Inferential learning theory suggests that subjects need to
retrieve episodic memories of A+ trials during either AX+
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training or testing in order to make a valid inference about the
non-efficacy of cue X (e.g., De Houwer, 2009). Of note, subjects
do not need to remember the AX+ trials, because the blocking
effect can already be attained during actual AX+ training. In line
with this argument, a study of Vandorpe et al. (2007) showed that
forward blocking does come to depend on memory for AX+ if
realization of the blocking effect during actual AX+ training is
interfered with.
More evidence for the role of memory retrieval processes in cue
competition comes from a recent study. Boddez et al. (2011) inves-
tigated the effect of extinguishing a blocking cue on responding to
a blocked cue (i.e., A+ andAX+ training followed byA– training).
The results indicated that extinguishing A increased conditioned
responding to X. Crucially, this increase was context dependent:
Increased responding to X was limited to the context in which
extinction of A took place (for related findings in animal subjects
see Gunther et al., 1998; Blaisdell et al., 1999). Because mem-
ory accessibility is known to be context dependent (contexts can
either facilitate or disfacilitate retrieval of specific memories; Bou-
ton, 2002), these findings suggest that the blocking effect depends
on memory retrieval of the blocking cue as an effective cause or
predictor of the outcome.
Memory rehearsal
Another memory process affecting cue competition is rehearsal.
Meeter and Murre (2004) distinguish between two forms of
rehearsal. A first mechanism is a passive or an indirectly triggered
form of rehearsal, more precisely the activation of memory traces
evoked by related cues. A second mechanism is an active or, what
they call, a “conscious” form of rehearsal: goal-directed, effortful
and repeated retrieval of memory associations.
The passive form of rehearsal is closely related to the associa-
tive concept of within compound associations. Van Hamme and
Wasserman (1994) have revised the traditional Rescorla–Wagner
model and Dickinson and Burke (1996) have revised Wagner’s
(1981) SOP model so that these models incorporate a within
compound association mechanism, which allows these models to
explain learning about absent cues. Let us illustrate this idea by
means of backward blocking. The Dickinson and Burke (1996)
model assumes that, during AX+ training, a within compound
association forms between cue A and cue X. Indeed, a significant
positive correlation between the strength of memory for com-
pounds and backward blocking has been reported (e.g., Melchers
et al., 2004) and interfering with the formation of memory for
compounds is known to reduce the backward blocking effect
(e.g., Dickinson and Burke, 1996; Aitken et al., 2001). The within
compound association allows cue A to activate a mental repre-
sentation of cue X during A+ training, which can subsequently
lead to further learning about X. This mechanism is easily refor-
mulated to passive rehearsal (Meeter and Murre, 2004), where
the physically presented cue A activates the associated memory
representations of cue X due to a process of spreading of activa-
tion. Without going into detail about the aforementioned revised
models, this within-compound mechanism (or passive rehearsal
mechanism) allows these models to account for backward block-
ing by means of the additional assumption that the associative
strength of a cue that is indirectly activated but absent changes
in the opposite direction of cues that are present: the associative
strength of A will increase during the A+ trials; consequently,
the associative strength of the retrieved but absent cue X will
decrease.
Rehearsal, either the active or the passive form, can also account
for retrospective cue competition and backward blocking if one
assumes that the entire formerAX+ compound trials are rehearsed
during the subsequent A+ trials (e.g., Chapman, 1991; Melchers
et al., 2004). Ludvig et al. (2010) presented an extension of the
Rescorla–Wagner model in which it is assumed that subjects men-
tally replay previous trials with consequences similar to actual
presentations of those trials. This allows them to explain back-
ward blocking because replaying AX+ trials during A+ training
will result in overexpectation and hence a decrement in associative
strength of both A and X. For cue A this decrement will however
be countered because of the A+ training, whereas this will not be
the case for cue X.
In summary, it is clear that a variety of memory processes play
an important role in cue competition effects.
INHIBITION
Cognitive inhibition refers to the suppression or inhibitory regu-
lation of content that is active in working memory (e.g., Harnish-
feger, 1995; Nigg, 2000; Kipp, 2005). Accordingly and perhaps not
surprisingly, cognitive inhibition has been implicated in reason-
ing.More precisely, it has been claimed that inhibitionof irrelevant
thoughts and inappropriate beliefs is central to human reasoning
(e.g., De Neys and Van Gelder, 2009). Such inhibition is possi-
bly also involved in the higher-order reasoning processes that can
lead to cue competition effects: Thinking about a cue undergo-
ing blocking training might bring to mind the outcome through
memory processes, but a reasoning process could afterward still
lead to the conclusion that the blocked cue is actually not (causally)
related to the outcome. That is, a logical reasoning process might
inhibit and override what people intuitively think of (e.g., DeNeys
and Van Gelder, 2009). Dual-process theories indeed assume that
the so-called rule-based system can inhibit and overrule represen-
tations activated by the so-called associative system (e.g., Sloman,
1996). Interestingly, also in the comparator theory framework
(Miller and Schachtman, 1985; Miller and Matzel, 1988), the cue
does activate the representation of the outcome during testing. As
a matter of fact, running of the comparator process presupposes
activation of the outcome representation by the cue. It is only after
the activation of the outcome representation that the comparator
process can determine whether or not the activation of the asso-
ciation will result in responding. This is similar to the interplay
between higher-order reasoning and inhibition: Presentation of a
cue that underwent cue competition training can bring to mind
the outcome through associativememory, but reasoning processes
can afterward still lead to the conclusion that the cue is actually
not (causally) related to the outcome, which in turn would lead to
low responding to the tested cue and, hence, a behavioral display
of cue competition.
Response inhibition is different from cognitive inhibition: It
refers to the suppression of a prepotent response in favor of
performing a subdominant response (e.g., Harnishfeger, 1995;
Nigg, 2000; Kipp, 2005). Such inhibition can be described as the
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mechanism that results in the containment of prepotent behav-
ioral responses when such responses are inappropriate or incorrect
(e.g., Burle et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). The discussion
of this process is left for the general discussion, because convincing
arguments or evidence for its involvement in cue competition are
currently still lacking.
SECTION 2: A COGNITIVE STAGE FRAMEWORK FOR CUE
COMPETITION
The present section of this paper describes an integrative frame-
work for understanding cue competition effects. The cognitive
processes discussed in the first section of the paper serve as
building blocks to engineer this framework.
The framework contends that behavioral display of cue com-
petition is cognitively construed following three cognitive stages
that include (1) the encoding stage, (2) the retention stage, and (3)
the performance stage. Arguably, these three cognitive stages are
essential in understanding cue competition effects. We contend
that later behavioral display of cue competition can be achieved,
undone or affected in all three stages. The output of each stage
serves as input for the next stage. This implies a cascade mecha-
nism: If later behavioral display of cue competition is not achieved
at an earlier stage (e.g., encoding), then it may still occur at a later
stage (e.g., retention or performance). Similarly, if later behavioral
display of cue competition is successfully achieved at an earlier
stage (e.g., encoding), it may still be undone at a later stage (e.g.,
retention or performance). Different cognitive mechanisms are
involved in the framework, some of which operate only in cer-
tain stages, while others operate in multiple stages. As will become
clear, the framework incorporates assumptions and mechanisms
of several established learning models.
Figure 1 summarizes the framework, with both the processes
that are involved in only the encoding stage, the retention stage
or the performance stage, and the processes that are involved in
multiple stages. Needless to say, such framework is always incom-
plete, and like any theory always incorrect, in that many aspects of
the real world are inevitably ignored or idealized. Still, we believe
that the present stage framework may support a comprehensive
understanding of cue competition effects.
ENCODING STAGE
In this subsection, we focus on the processes operating during the
encoding phase of the learning episode.
Panels 1a,b in Figure 1 represent the gateway function of per-
ception in our framework. Panel 1a in Figure 1 shows that a
failure to perceptually process a cue during a learning episode
is the earliest potential source of cue competition effects in the
stage framework: The subject must obviously detect the stimulus
during the learning episode in order to come to respond in its
presence (see Pearce and Bouton, 2001, for a similar argument).
FIGURE 1 | A cognitive stage framework for understanding cue competition effects in associative learning. See section one of the present paper for a
discussion of the processes and their relevance in cue competition procedures and see section two of the present paper for details concerning the dynamics of
the stage framework.
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If the cue is perceptually detected during training, other pro-
cesses come into play, as indicated by panel 1b of Figure 1. More
precisely, attentional regulation processes and attentional bias are
next up in the line of cognitive processes that may affect or result
in cue competition effects (see Panel 2 of Figure 1). Attentional
regulation allows to direct attention to information that is rele-
vant to task demands (e.g., a non-redundant blocking cue) and
allows to turn attention away from superfluous information (e.g.,
a redundant blocked cue). Such attentional processes might lead
to cue competition effects under the assumption that the amount
of learning and therefore responding to a cue is modulated by
the amount of attention paid to such stimulus (e.g., Mackin-
tosh, 1975). Under the same assumption, attentional bias might
lead to cue competition effects as well: In a blocking procedure,
the previously trained cue A might take up a disproportionally
large amount of attention during AX+ training. This appears
to be a distinct possibility in conditioning procedures with a
biologically significant outcome, as threat and reward related
attentional biases have been reliably demonstrated in a variety
of experimental paradigms (Bradley et al., 2004; Bar-Haim et al.,
2007).
The present framework asserts that a complete failure to pro-
cess a cue (either because of lack of perceptual detection or as a
result of attentional mechanisms) would produce an irreversible
acquisition deficit, such that retrospective revaluation of that cue
(e.g., recovery from blocking by extinguishing the blocking cue;
e.g., Blaisdell et al., 1999) should not be observed. Accordingly, this
is also the single exception to our assumption that behavioral dis-
play of cue competition that is achieved at an earlier stage may still
be affected or undone at a later stage. This occurs because stim-
uli that are not processed at an early stage do not gain access to
memory (e.g., Kastner andUngerleider, 2000;Mitchell et al., 2006)
and retrospective revaluation does require the presence of mem-
ory associations between the cue at hand and either the outcome
or other cues that were present during training.
RETENTION STAGE
In this part, we turn to the processes at play in the timeframe
between encoding and performance. A crucial assumption of the
stage framework we propose is that successful cue competition
can be affected in a chain of subsequent information processing
stages. If later behavioral display of cue competition is not real-
ized through processes at play in the encoding stage, it can still
be attained in the retention or performance stage. Similarly, suc-
cessfully achieved cue competition can also be affected or undone
in later stages (except in the case where cue competition results
from a complete failure to process the cue of interest during the
encoding phase).
Panel 3 in Figure 1 indicates the presumed importance of
rehearsal processes during the retention stage. Rehearsal, either
the active or the passive form (Meeter and Murre, 2004), can for
example lead to retrospective cue competition if events that involve
a competing cue are rehearsed (e.g., backward blocking; see Lud-
vig et al., 2010) or to recovery from cue competition if the cue
of interest is passively rehearsed in the absence of the outcome
(e.g., release from overshadowing due to extinction of the com-
peting stimulus; Dickinson and Burke, 1996). This illustrates that
the relation between a blocked cue and an outcome can change in
the time between learning and testing, and this without additional
training with the blocked cue itself.
PERFORMANCE STAGE
In this subsection, we will discuss processes that modulate
responding to a cue that underwent cue competition training.
Before discussing these processes, we will describe how existing
theories account for performance of learned behavior.
Provided that cue competition has been successfully achieved
in the encoding or retention stage, the only challenge left is to
demonstrate so during testing. We will first discuss how the tra-
ditional AFMs (e.g., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh,
1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980) explain low responding to a cue
that underwent cue competition training. Most AFMs assume
that cue competition training hinders development of a strong
link between cue and outcome. This allows these models to pro-
vide a straightforward explanation for low responding to a cue
that underwent cue competition training: A weak link between
cue and outcome implies weak responding. It should however be
noted that the link formation account of how responding is gener-
ated is somewhat problematic, because it has been demonstrated
that there is no one-on-one mapping between associative strength
and performance (Rescorla, 2001, 2006).
Still building on the case where cue competition has been
successfully achieved in the encoding or storage stage, inferen-
tial learning theory holds a rather different view on retrieval and
response generation. Mitchell et al. (2009) theorized that learning
itself is the consequence of non-automatic inferential reasoning,
whereas retrieval of such learning can result from automaticmem-
ory retrieval. So, if subjects in for example a blocking procedure,
are able to make a valid inference about the blocked cue before
testing, they should be able to retrieve that acquired knowledge
automatically. An experiment in which a dual task load is applied
during only the test phase of a blocking procedure might put this
hypothesis to the test, but has -to the best of our knowledge-
not yet been carried out. However, Morís et al. (2014) recently
demonstrated blocking using a recognition priming test (a test
which depends on automatic retrieval processes), providing some
evidence for this possibility. It should be noted that response gen-
eration is as challenging to inferential learning theories as it is
to AFMs: Responses are assumed to be the behavioral expression
of beliefs entertained by the subject, but how this translation is
done is poorly understood (Baeyens et al., 2009; Mitchell et al.,
2009).
Up until now we have considered the case in which cue com-
petition had been successfully achieved in either the encoding or
the storage phase, which implies that response generation was the
only challenge left. The framework we propose, however, asserts
that cue competition can also be affected at the performance stage
itself (See panel 4 in Figure 1).
While perceiving a cue is obviously necessary for learning about
it, recognition of the similarity or difference between a cue at
the time of testing and learning is also a critical perceptual phe-
nomenon. That is, cue competition may not only involve cases of
failing to perceive a cue during training, but failure to perceive it
at test as well (due to a change in percept; Pearce, 1987, 1994).
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As a sidenote, it is worth mentioning that learning theorists have
recently speculated about the role of attention during performance
as well (e.g., Kruschke, 2001; Craddock and Miller, 2014) and it
is hoped that future studies will deliver supporting evidence that
can result in updating of the present framework.
MULTIPLE STAGE PROCESSES
In this subsection, we focus on the processes that operate in mul-
tiple stages. Panel 5 of Figure 1 gives an overview of the processes
that cannot be tied down to a single stage: higher-order reason-
ing, working memory, episodic memory, memory retrieval, and
cognitive inhibition.
Inferential learning theorists have argued that information
about different events is stored in memory in a non-competitive
manner and that this stored information can then be retrieved
and used in a flexible manner by a higher-order reasoning system
(Beckers et al., 2006; De Houwer et al., 2007). From this perspec-
tive, inferential learning theory advocates a performance-focused
view of cue competition, very much like for example comparator
theory (Miller and Schachtman, 1985; Miller and Matzel, 1988).
But, proponents of the inferential reasoning account add that rea-
soning processes may also be operating during the initial learning
episode or in the timeframe between initial learning and perfor-
mance (e.g., De Houwer and Beckers, 2003; De Houwer et al.,
2005). Thus, under the appropriate boundary conditions, reason-
ing processes may affect cue competition during all three stages.
Particularly interesting is the previously discussed study of De
Houwer and Beckers (2003), in which a heightened response to
a blocked cue was observed when a dual task load was adminis-
tered during both training and testing (Experiment 2), whereas
this increase was not significant when a dual task was admin-
istered in the training phase only (Experiment 1). De Houwer
and Beckers (2003, p. 355) offer an interpretation for the dif-
ference between their Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 that fits
nicely with the stage framework we propose: “It is therefore pos-
sible that participants in the difficult secondary task condition
of Experiment 1 compensated for the lack of opportunity for
deductive reasoning during the learning phase by engaging in
more deductive reasoning during the test phase. Such a compen-
satory strategy was less likely in Experiment 2 because a secondary
task was also present during the test phase.” They indeed argue
that if later behavioral display of cue competition is not achieved
during the encoding stage, it can still be achieved during the
performance stage, a central tenet of the framework proposed
here.
Effortful cognitive processes rely on working memory capacity.
This turns working memory to a multiple stage process, because
the present stage framework suggests that effortful processingmay
be at play during all stages. Let us illustrate. Attentional regulation,
at play during the encoding stage, depends on working memory
(e.g., Kane et al., 2001; Engle, 2002; Schmidt et al., 2002). A similar
argument concerning the supportive or enabling role of working
memory can be made with respect to active rehearsal (e.g., Hasher
and Zacks, 1979) at play during the retention stage, and higher-
order reasoning (e.g., Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Johnson-Laird
and Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994), at play during the performance
stage, amongst others.
As discussed, episodic memory and memory retrieval are also
at play during all three stages. Even more so, we should also recog-
nize that subjects do not enter the encoding stage as a blank slate.
Subjects get into the encoding stage with a set of earlier experi-
ences and prior knowledge that might have important effects on
cue competition, especially in ecologically valid situations. For
example, suppose a person, eating potato chips and listening to
the theme song of his favorite television show, notices warplanes
flying overhead, followed by an air bombing attack. In such case,
episodicmemory of prior knowledge concerning warplanesmight
turn these warplanes to a strong competitor.
Finally, cognitive inhibition impacts several other cognitive
processes, which turns it to a multiple stage process in the cur-
rent framework. Let us illustrate with some examples. Attentional
regulation, at play in the encoding stage, has been described as
an instantiation of an inhibitory process, as it keeps attention
focused on the task at hand (e.g., Kane et al., 2001). Cognitive
inhibition has also been implicated in reasoning. More precisely,
it has been claimed that inhibition of irrelevant thoughts and
inappropriate beliefs is central to human reasoning in order to
prevent interference (e.g., Markovits and Barrouillet, 2002; De
Neys et al., 2005). As discussed, presentation of a cue that under-
went cue competition training may for example bring to mind
the outcome through memory processes, but interplay between
inhibitory and higher-order reasoning processes might still lead
to the conclusion that the cue is actually not (causally) related
to the outcome, which would lead to low responding to the
tested cue.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present paper is built on two pillars. First, we argued that
cue competition is no unitary phenomenon, but that different
processes are at play in a cue competition procedure. Existing
models typically invoke just one or two processes, which may
lead to an oversimplified view and to ignoring interplay. Second,
we organized processes known or assumed to be involved in cue
competition effects in a stage framework. We now turn to the
evaluation of this framework.
PARSIMONY
One may argue that it is unnecessary to invoke a myriad of pro-
cesses to explain cue competition effects, when parsimonious
AFMs (e.g., Rescorla andWagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce
and Hall, 1980; Miller and Schachtman, 1985; Miller and Matzel,
1988) can explain such effects as well. Although the class of AFMs
might indeed do a good job at accounting for cue competition
effects, many of the findings discussed in this paper are beyond
the scope of individual AFMs. AFMs that characterize cue com-
petition effects as reflecting an irreversible acquisition deficit (e.g.,
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce and Hall,
1980) can for example not explain that what is retrieved from
long term memory determines whether or not cue competition
will be displayed during testing (e.g., Boddez et al., 2011). AFMs
that characterize cue competition as a performance phenomenon
(Miller and Schachtman, 1985; Miller and Matzel, 1988), to give
another example, can in their turnnot explain the attentional shifts
observed during initial cue competition training (e.g., Beesley and
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Le Pelley, 2011). Similarly, there are demonstrations of blocking
that are out of scope of inferential learning theory. Lovibond et al.
(2003), for example, observed a small forward blocking effect in
their non-additive group, so under circumstances when it was
not logical to infer non-efficacy of the blocked cue. So although
the present stage framework might not be very parsimonious, we
believe that this is warranted because a more parsimonious theory
or framework should only be preferred above a less parsimonious
one if both have the same explanatory power. A possible way
to bring the sometimes intense debates about cue competition
(acquisition versus performance accounts; AFMs versus inferen-
tial accounts) to an end might be to let go of the assumption that
cue competition is an unitary phenomenon and to consider the
possibility that different processes can underlie cue competition
effects.
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS AND EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
Because we argue that cue competition effects can be caused by
different processes, it is highly important to identify the boundary
conditions that determine which process will be responsible for a
cue competition effect in a particular situation. This is an impor-
tant challenge for future research. The framework we propose
already provides some hints about these boundary conditions. A
testable prediction derived from the current framework is that
recovery from cue competition is possible, except when it is caused
by a processing failure during encoding. One could set up an
experiment where one induces cue competition due to a process-
ing failure in one condition but not in a second condition. One
way to induce such failure is to use many different trials, each with
a large number of filler stimuli (Vandorpe and De Houwer, 2006;
McLaren et al., 2014). Another possibility would be to use the dot-
probe task to manipulate attention away (MacLeod et al., 2002)
from the target cue X. In the second condition, one could use a
standard blocking task in which such processing failure is rather
unlikely (Blaisdell, 2003). The current framework holds that cue
competition due to a processing failure is resistant to revalua-
tion. So, a manipulation such as extinguishing the blocking cue A
(Boddez et al., 2011) would not produce an increase in responding
to the target cue X in the first condition. However, in the second
condition, cue competition would remain reversible, because it is
hypothesized that cue competition due to other mechanisms than
a processing failure can be affected in the other stages of the cur-
rent framework. Accordingly, recovery from cue competition can
be used to inform us about the underlying process in a particular
situation. Other boundary conditions include that the possibility
of attaining cue competition during the retention stage depends
on the presence of a memory trace between the cue of interest and
either the outcome or other cues that were present during training
(seeMitchell et al., 2006). Finally, achieving cue competition at the
performance stage is only possible if the predictive or causal status
of competing cues is retrieved from long-term memory (Boddez
et al., 2011).
One might moreover predict that individual differences in the
processes discussed in this paper will covary with the amount
of cue competition. Various measures exist which can tap into
these individual difference variables. For example, questionnaires
such as the attentional control scale (Derryberry and Reed, 2002)
may be used to predict the strength of cue competition effects
in humans. Another instance of “individual differences” is the
difference between non-human and human animals. It is some-
times argued that animals do not possess the complex cognitive
processes of humans. Although it is possible that cue competi-
tion in animals is due to only a subset of the processes discussed
in the framework, we do not see a reason to make such argu-
ment a priori. Indeed, there is some evidence to support the idea
that rats are able to reason about cues and outcomes (Beckers
et al., 2006; Blaisdell et al., 2006) and, in addition, the frame-
work might inspire further studies. To assess the role of working
memory, for example, one might develop a task to compare
cue competition under single- and dual-task load conditions in
animals.
Future research should also focus on the interaction and the
temporal dynamics of the different processes. We tried to provide
insight in the dynamics of the different processes by means of
the stage framework (see Figure 1) and by describing the way
in which the different processes are interdependent (see Multiple
StageProcesses). However, this is only a first step and there is a clear
need for empirical data addressing the time course of blocking-
related processes (for a great example see Liu and Luhmann,2013).
In addition, future research could focus on response inhibi-
tion, a process left out of the present formulation of the stage
framework because its involvement in cue competition is cur-
rently still too speculative. Response inhibition refers to the
suppression of a prepotent response in favor of performing a
subdominant response (e.g., Harnishfeger, 1995; Nigg, 2000;
Kipp, 2005) and is an essential element of the response selection
mechanisms that contribute to adaptive behavior and accurate
performance (e.g., Roberts et al., 1998). Under the assumption
that responding to a cue is the prepotent response and withhold-
ing responding is the subdominant response, response inhibition
might very well be involved in cue competition effects. Pre-
liminary evidence for this assumption comes from an animal
study showing that subjects tend to respond rather than not
respond whenever a source of uncertainty is thrown into the
course of events. It was indeed found in an animal study that
subjects showed high responding to a cue that underwent cue
competition training when testing took place in an ambiguous
context (Gunther et al., 1998). In associative terms, our suggestion
implies that a cue that undergoes cue competition treatment is
endowed with both excitatory and inhibitory properties. Research
has shown that inhibitory regulation is attenuated by shifts in
the (physical or temporal) context and by presenting the out-
come by itself before testing (for a review, see Bouton, 2002).
Accordingly, researchers often rely on demonstrations of such
attenuation when looking for evidence for inhibition (e.g.,Miguez
et al., 2014). Most interestingly, animal studies have demon-
strated that inserting a retention interval between training and
testing (i.e., a spontaneous recovery procedure; Kraemer et al.,
1988; Cole et al., 1997; Pineño et al., 2005b) and presenting the
outcome by itself (i.e., a reinstatement procedure; Balaz et al.,
1982) strongly decrease cue competition. Such findings are out
of scope of current learning models, but fit with the suggestion
that response inhibition is involved in the performance stage of
cue competition.
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INTERACTION WITH OTHER DISCIPLINES
Association formation models have their own language, which
might have isolated them to a certain degree from other domains
in psychology where the cognitive revolution has left more per-
manent marks. Researchers interested in for example attentional
control might not make use of cue competition procedures
merely because they do not realize that attentional control is
largely synonymous to what learning psychologists call learned
inattention. Still, cue competition remains among the most
intensively investigated effects in learningpsychology,which estab-
lishes it as a thoroughly explored method for examining several
phenomena.
Neuroscientists that use blocking as a tool to gain insight in
the neural correlates of prediction error and low-level associa-
tive mechanisms (e.g., Steinberg et al., 2013) might be interested
to learn that, in fact, multiple higher-order cognitive processes
are involved in blocking. Neuroscientists interested in memory
plasticity might in their turn benefit from the use of retrospec-
tive revaluation procedures in which cue competition effects are
altered without any additional training involving the cue of inter-
est (e.g., Corlett et al., 2004; San-Galli et al., 2011; Sharpe and
Killcross, 2014).
The framework we propose is also in line with findings from
developmental research. Several of the abovementioned func-
tions (e.g., working memory and inferential reasoning) develop
during childhood (Greenberg et al., 1977; Byrnes and Overton,
1986, 1988; Cowan, 1997). In late adulthood functions like
working memory, associative memory formation and memory
retrieval deteriorate (Hartman et al., 2001; Mutter et al., 2006,
2012; Old and Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). Research has shown
that cue competition emerges alongside the development of
these functions. Levels of cue competition are associated with
the development of reasoning abilities and working memory
(Simms et al., 2012; McCormack et al., 2013; also see Livesey
et al., 2013). Mutter et al. (2012) observed decreased levels of
cue competition in older adults, associated with deterioration in
associative memory formation and retrieval. Future developmen-
tal research can be expanded to other processes described in the
framework.
The present framework can also encourage cross talks between
fundamental learning research and clinical research. Blocking has
been reported to be diminished or even abolished in individu-
als with schizophrenia (e.g., Jones et al., 1992; Bender et al., 2001),
whichhas sparked the suggestion that blockingmaybe auseful pre-
clinical laboratory model for studying symptoms associated with
schizophrenia (Moran et al., 2008). Among the same lines, Boddez
et al. (2012) demonstrated that blocking in aversive conditioning is
a valuable tool for gaining insight in the threat appraisal and gen-
eralization processes gone awry in pathological anxiety. A deficit
in blocking, or a deficit in cue competition at the more general
level, indeed results in fear to become disconnected from the most
likely causes or predictors of danger. Anxiety and schizophrenia
might exert their effects through one or more of the processes
described in the present framework. An important challenge for
future research is therefore to precisely determine themechanisms
that cause variation in individuals that are at risk for or suffer from
pathology.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we hope that the reader will agree with our conclusion
that cue competition effects are driven by a flexible and dynamic
system. Arguably, a variety of processes will need to be consid-
ered when the story of cue competition is finally written. We also
hope that the present paper might inspire to breach some barri-
ers. Numerous cognitive processes have not yet been thoroughly
explored in cue competition procedures. Still, our understanding
of both these processes and cue competition effects might increase
from doing so.
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